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10Abstract Externalism about artifactual words requires that (a) members of an arti-
11factual word’s extension share a common nature, i.e. a set of necessary features, and
12(b) that possession of such features determines the word’s extension independently of
13whether the linguistic community is aware of them (ignorance) or can accurately
14describe them (error). However, many common artifactual words appear to be so used
15that features that are universally shared among members of their extensions are hard
16to come by, and even fewer can be plausibly regarded as necessary; morevoer, it is
17highly doubtful that a speaker could manage to refer to kind A while being utterly
18ignorant of the role the As play in the A-producing community, and it is no less
19doubtful that an artifactual word that was used to refer to certain objects would keep
20referring to them (and be regarded as having referred to them) once it has been shown
21that the associated description is utterly false of such objects, the reason being that we
22could easily make things that do fit the associated description. Against generalized
23externalism, it is suggested that artifactual words come in (at least) three different
24semantic varieties: a few have an externalist semantics, others have an internalist
25semantics, still others have neither but rather behave as “family names” in
26Wittgenstein’s sense.
271 Putnam’s Externalist Claim and Schwartz’s Objections Q3
28In his justly celebrated paper of 1975, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, Hilary Putnam
29was not content with showing that natural kind and natural substance words such as
30water and beech did not work the way traditional semantics had taken them to work;
31he also insisted, albeit briefly, that the same was true of artifactual kind words such as
32pencil. As with natural kind and natural substance words, so the extension of pencil
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34the word, such as being an instrument for writing of a certain shape, size and
35materials; on the contrary, pencil primarily referred to these entities about here,
36whatever their nature and whether or not they fitted a description such as the one I
37just gave. ‘When we use the word pencil, we intend to refer to whatever has the same
38nature as the normal examples of the local pencils in the actual world’ ( Q4Putnam 1975,
39243). So for example if it turned out that pencils are organisms, not artifacts made of
40wood and graphite as we believe them to be, they would still be pencils and it would
41be correct to call them thus. According to Putnam, this example shows that pencil has
42what is nowadays called an externalist semantics, like gold and tiger. Putnam did not
43specify what it was for something to have the same nature as these pencils (Schwartz
441978, 571); clearly he didn’t have in mind natural nature, i.e. deep physical consti-
45tution as exemplified by molecular structure or DNA. He was certainly aware that
46there are iron spoons, aluminun spoons, silver spoons, and even golden spoons.
47It could have been objected to Putnam that his example only showed that
48what had been taken to be an artifactual word might turn out not to be such
49(but, perhaps, a natural kind word); if so, then the example could hardly be
50instructive as to the semantics of genuine artifactual words. Similarly, if it
51turned out that tigers do not constitute a natural kind then tiger would not be
52a natural kind word and wouldn’t be expected to have the semantics of natural
53kind words (on Putnam’s own lights, 1975, 240–1). Anyway, as far as I know
54this is not the objection that was raised against Putnam’s suggestion about
55pencil. Instead, it was objected that the pencil-organisms thought experiment
56did not at all show what it purported to show, i.e. that artifactual words are
57used indexically, not descriptively. In fact, the descriptive user of the word
58pencil is happy to apply the word to the newly discovered organisms, as they
59fit the description he associates with the word; she would only be reluctant to
60call the organisms pencils if she took the feature “being an artifact” to be part
61of the description (Schwartz 1978, 568–9). But, Schwartz argued, it need not be
62so. If this further assumption is not made and the pencil-organisms are pencil-
63shaped and can be used for writing,1 then nothing shows that pencil does not
64have a descriptive, non-indexical semantics. In fact, Schwartz argued, it can be
65shown that artifactual words do not have an indexical semantics. For a word to
66have an indexical semantics, i.e. to refer to whatever has the same nature as
67certain paradigmatic examples, some notion of nature must be specified for the
68relevant kind. But artificial kinds have no underlying nature: no deep feature or
69bundle of features plays the role of molecular structure or DNA in character-
70izing pencils, or chairs, or sloops. “Terms for kinds of artifacts do not even
71start out as indexical” (1978, 572).
72In making his case against Putnam in his (1978) and the later, expanded
73(1980), Schwartz put forth several claims all of which were challenged in the
74ensuing discussion: that artifacts do not have a nature; that it doesn’t make
75sense to conduct empirical research to determine what e.g. a sloop is (1980,
76183); that artifactual kinds do not support inductions (1978, 573); that no
77sentence in which an artifactual word is in subject position passes the
1 Contrary to later participants in the discussion (e.g. Nelson 1982), Putnam was not assuming that in
believing they can we had been the victims of some collective delusion.
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78“counterexample test” (i.e., if As are artifacts it may well be the case that all
79As but one are F, for any F) (1978, 569; 1980, 187). But he also made a
80remark that, as far as I know, has gone unchallenged and that I take to be
81crucial in the discussion of artifactual semantics.2 He highlighted the persis-
82tence of descriptions. Suppose we discover that all pencils are organisms, as in
83Putnam’s thought experiment; or, even more radically, we discover that they are
84alien spying devices which were never used for writing: the belief that they
85were, and that they were just wood and graphite, etc. is the effect of a
86collective delusion instilled in us by the aliens.3 In such circumstances, we
87might find that we need writing instruments after all and that wooden cylinders
88with a graphite inside are especially handy. So we start making such objects,
89corresponding to the description of pencils we had found to be false of the
90spying devices. Schwartz commented that “we would all think that now we
91have [real pencils], not one of those impostor ones from Mars” (1983, 477),
92and I believe we should agree with him. In other words, even when the
93description associated with an artifactual kind word is found not to apply to
94objects that had been regarded as paradigmatic examples of the relevant kind,
95the word would still apply to other objects conforming to the description: the
96description persists as a criterion for the application of that word. By contrast,
97once we have discovered that paradigmatic water is H2O all and only H2O
98counts as water, whether or not it has the superficial properties that used to
99characterize water.4
100Now, the point appears to be that in the case of pencils and other artifacts we can
101make such description-fitting objects (for artifacts are things we make). If we were to
102discover that cats are Martian robots, we could hardly make a “genuine” cat (at least
103so far). Hence, we would be left with two options: we might choose to say that cats
104really are Martian robots (giving priority to reference, as with Putnam’s suggestion),
105or we might choose to say that there really are no cats, giving priority to “meaning”,
106or associated description. But if the belief that one can sit on chairs turned out to be an
107illusion (for chairs are really holograms from outer space) it wouldn’t be hard to
108produce artifacts that do fit the description originally associated with chair - “genu-
109ine” chairs - and chances are we would call them chair. Why? Not simply because of
110inferential inertia, i.e. because we are used to associate the word chair with the word
111sit, but because of the role artifacts play in our life. Contrary to natural objects,
112artifacts exist because of our interests, needs, and values (Thomasson 2007, 63):
2 The remark was first put forward in (1978), in a somewhat incohate and not very convincing form
(pp.569–70). It can be found in its full-fledged form in (1980), p.191, and (1983), p.477. What I here call
persistence Schwartz calls dominance.
3 As in Nelson’s (1982) thought experiment, see below.
4 It could be objected that in such a case we would be producing a new kind, that we might or might not
baptize chair (perhaps chair2 as distinct from chair1, which would name the holograms). On the contrary, I
believe we would stop calling the holograms chairs once we discover that they do not have the point we
had taken them to have; morevoer, we would have no reason to introduce a new name in connection with
the newly produced, genuine pieces of furniture, as they do have the point associated with the old name.
Here it may seem I am just marshalling one set of intuitions against another (the causal-historical in-
tuitions). However, what I take to be telling is the contrast with the natural kind case: the reason we might
stick with the word cat to name robocats is that we cannot produce entities that do fit the description we
used to associate with cat.
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113words such as chair and pencil are, first and foremost, associated with the satisfaction
114of such needs and the realization of such values. This is why descriptions that involve
115an artifact’s role in a human community’s life tend to persist as criteria of application
116for artifactual words within that community, even across changes in material consti-
117tution, mechanism and shape. Cell phones do not much look like early 20th century
118telephones, they work on different physical principles, and their inside is quite
119different; nevertheless, we call them [tele]phones because the role they play in our
120life is perceived as continuous with the role landline telephones used to play (and still
121do play, occasionally).5 Similarly, hand processors are called frullatori a immersione
122(immersion blenders) in Italian, supposedly because they are perceived as being
123continuous with (traditional) blenders in their purpose and the needs they serve,
124whereas English introduced a new name, giving priority to shape and mode of use.6
125To approximate what I have been calling “the role an artifact plays in our life”, the
126word function has often been used. No doubts, many artifacts have characteristic
127functions in more than one sense. Take pencils: they have (1) the causal power of
128leaving traces of graphite on paper or other suitable supports, they are (2) used by people
129because of such power, i.e. they are used to leave traces of graphite on paper, and (3)
130they Q5are regularly (re)produced because of such power.7 As we shall see below, the use
131of artifactual words does not seem to go with artifactual function in any of these senses:
132the same word may be used for artifacts that have different causal powers, or that are
133used for different aims, or that have different Millikanian proper functions. However,
134this is not the point I would like to stress here. Suppose one ignored that (4) pencils,
135rather than pens or other writing instruments, are selectively used because the traces they
136leave are easily erased, for users of pencils are the sort of beings that change their minds,
137may want to get rid of written traces, have reasons to economize on paper, and so forth
138(other artifact-using beings might not share such features). Surely one who knew about
139(1), (2) and (3) but ignored (4) would be missing something about pencils: he would be
140missing their point, so to speak. No doubt, that pencils can have such point is a
141consequence of the material they are made of; however, one could not determine that
142pencils do have that point by researching pencils and their material constitution. Instead,
143one would have to research the human community of pencil users.
144Let me stress the distinction between an artifact’s function (in any of several senses)
145and its point. Consider presbyopia eyeglasses. They are designed to improve the eye’s
146ability to focus on near objects by compensating for changes in the crystalline lens’s
147curvature: this is their function (1); improving focus on near objects is their function (2),
5 This should be intended as a remark about artifactual kind words, not artifactual kinds. There may be
reasons to insist that e.g. cell phones and traditional telephones belong to different ontological kinds
(Carrara and Vermaas 2009).
6 Other differences between languages concerning artifactual words are mentioned by Malt and Sloman
(2007, 96).
7 These specifications of artifactual function correspond to accounts (1), (2), and (4) of Carrara and
Vermaas (2009), i.e. to the designer intentions account, the user intentions account, and the etiological
account. I do not endorse their “causal role account” (“the technical functions of an artifact are the
capacities by which it causally contributes to capacities of larger more complex systems”) because of its
counterintuitive implications: though a screw in an airplane may causally contribute to the airplane’s
stability because of its weight, this is not one of the screw’s functions in any plausible sense. Not every
causal effect is a function. If an engine could only run properly because of some bug that got caught in its
wheels, we still wouldn’t say the bug’s function is to make the engine run.
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148i.e. the goal for which they are used; their capacity to improve focus on near objects is
149also the reason why their are reproduced, i.e. their function (3). But why would their
150users, particularly modern human beings, be specially interested in improving vision of
151near objects? The answer is, mostly, because of the widespread activity of reading.
152Reading is of vital importance for a human being to cope with a modern environment (as
153opposed to the Pleistocene); this is why reading is a large part of the point of presbyopia
154glasses, though it is not, strictly, their function in any of the above specified senses. Or
155again, take -once more- chairs. They are, no doubt, for sitting upon, and there are many
156reasons for which we often need to sit rather than stand. But in addition to that, chairs are
157pieces of furniture: as such, they are objects of aesthetic, not just functional evaluation.
158One who didn’t know that chairs can be pretty (even beautiful) or ugly, or that a given
159chair may or may not fit some interior decoration, would be missing part of the point of
160chairs (though fully aware of their function).
161This, I suggest, is the main reason why externalism about artifactual words is bound
162to fail in many cases. The use of artifactual words is governed by point more than by
163form, function, or the association of form and function.8 But point cannot be reduced to
164features that artifacts possess because of the kind of objects they are—such features as an
165alien researcher could discover by examining them, as he could discover an element’s
166atomic number or an organism’s DNA.
1672 Semantic Externalism About Kind Words
168Semantic externalism on kind words in general is the view on which, once a word W
169has been associated (by way of baptism or otherwise) with certain items in the world,
170W’s reference is determined by identity or similarity of nature with the initial items
171(the kind’s “paradigms”): Wapplies to an item x if and only if x shares the paradigms’
172nature.9 Objective identity (or similarity) of nature determines W’s reference whether
173or not individual speakers, or the linguistic community as a whole are in a position to
174describe it accurately or to establish that it holds.10 For example, gold applies to a
175chunk of matter x if and only if x is mostly constituted of atoms that have atomic
176number 79. If gold does apply to x, then it applied to x even when the linguistic
177community did not possess any theory involving atomic number, let alone methods to
178determine it.
179Hence, for a kind-word to have an externalist semantics two conditions must be in
180place:
181(a) members of the word’s extension share a nature, i.e. there are features necessarily
182belonging to all and only the members of the word’s extension;
8 The anthropological bias of artifactual words has been stressed by Putman (1982), Elder (1999), and
Thomasson (2007).
9 Here I am not choosing between a descriptive and a normative sense of “applies” (“ought to apply”). I
believe the present discussion is not affected by the distinction.
10 I personally favour this notion of externalism; anyway, it is the notion that appears to be taken for granted
(or explicitly appealed to) by philosophers arguing for externalism about artifactual words (see e.g.
Kornblith 1980, 110–111; Nelson 1982, 362; Putman 1982, 418–419).
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183(b) the word’s extension is determined by possession of such features independently
184of whether the linguistic community (and its individual members) are aware of it
185or can accurately describe it.
186Q6Against semantic externalism (1): no common essence. This being so, it seems that
187the case for semantic externalism about artificial kind words is doomed from the
188start. First, finding a cluster of features that could plausibly play the role of a nature
189or essence to be shared by members of an artifactual word’s extension has proved
190quite hard. At least for many common artifactual words, such as spoon, dish, chair,
191cup, bed, etc. material constitution won’t fit the bill. Function might seem a better
192candidate; however, Carrara and Vermaas ( Q72009, 135–136) have shown that for
193several distinctly characterized notions of function, the same word is used for
194artifacts that have different functions. For example, suppose we take function to
195be “the capacities for which [an] artifact is reproduced in a long-term sense”, as in
196Ruth Millikan’s theory (1984). Consider a tablet of Aspirin that was produced
197before 1950, and another that was recently produced. On the Millikanian notion of
198function, the first tablet’s function is pain-killing, as that is the capacity for which
199tablets of Aspirin were reproduced before 1950. The second tablet, however, has
200both pain-killing and blood-clot prevention as functions, for tablets of Aspirin are
201now reproduced for those capacities. Thus if function (so defined) is the essence, the
202two tablets have different essences. Yet we call both tablets Aspirin. The word
203Aspirin doesn’t seem to undergo any semantic change across change of Millikanian
204proper function.11 Other notions of function generate similar difficulties.12 How-
205ever, as we shall see below, some philosophers have experimented with complex
206“natures”, such as a combination of structural and functional features (Nelson 1982,
207362), or the conjunction of shape, proper function, and historically proper place-
208ment (Elder 2007).
209Against semantic externalism (2): impossibility of ignorance. But even if some
210notion of artifactual essence turned out to be viable -i.e., if condition (a) were satisfied-
211we would be in trouble with condition (b). For example, it would be surprising if a
212whole linguistic community were ignorant of an artifact’s constitution or function
213while using the corresponding artifactual word competently: for, after all, we make
214artifacts. To be sure, in many cases individual speakers may ignore an artifact’s
215constitution and function and still refer to instances of it in the appropriate way: I,
216for one, may occasionally use the word diode to refer to diodes, though I only have
217vague ideas about what diodes are for, and no idea at all of their structure. As
218Kornblith (2007) pointed out, the division of linguistic labor extends to artifactual
219words. However, it looks implausible that a whole community may produce the As
220without knowing their constitution, or what they are for Q8.13
221Notice that it does not follow that it is impossible for a community to make
222discoveries about artifacts’ functions, as about other properties of them. Examples
11 On proper function as the essence of artifactual kinds see Baker (2004).
12 For example, if function is identified with causal powers most artifacts will turn out to have many distinct
functions, as Thomasson noted (2007, 56).
13 Hence in order to argue for the possibility that a community of speakers may refer to an artifactual kind
without being aware of its function one must separate the linguistic community from the artifact-producing
community, as in Kornblith (1980, 2007). See below, 2.2.
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223are not uncommon: one is the already mentioned case of Aspirin; another is provided
224by the telephone, that was originally designed as an aid for the hard of hearing and
225later found to be generally effective as a long-distance communicator (Carrara and
226Vermaas 2009, 135). Similarly, copper wiring was originally produced for power
227distribution and later found to be of use in data communication. Or again, consider
228organisms that are the result of deliberate human interference, such as anthropogenic
229hybridization or genetic engineering. Such organisms (or, in some cases, species) can
230be regarded as artifacts, as they ontologically depend on non-accidental human
231action. Though some of their properties are known to their creators from the start,
232others may be unknown and the object of possible discoveries (witness the current
233debate on the potential risks connected with GMOs); even their “function”, e.g. the
234alimentary advantages in view of which they are created, may turn out to be different
235from what had been expected, or non-existent; morevoer, it may be discovered that
236they have unanticipated causal powers, hence unanticipated functions.
237Thus, critics of Schwartz have been right in claiming that it makes perfect sense to
238conduct empirical research on artifactual kinds (Putman 1982), though it is doubtful
239that such research could generally and unqualifiedly be described as into what an
240artifact is (this being the claim Schwartz had argued against in 1980).14 However, as
241far as functions in particular are concerned, though a newly discovered function may
242practically obliterate the original one it does not suppress it: if an artifactual device
243could do F, the discovery that it can do G as well does not cancel its F-ing capability,
244even though it may no longer be produced or used as an F-ing device.15 So, that an
245artifact may have functions that a whole community is unaware of does not entail that
246the community can be unaware of every function the artifact has—particularly of the
247function it has been constructed to perform. The latter claim looks implausible on the
248face of it. However, as we shall see, Kornblith has devised an ingenious argument in
249its favour.
2502.1 The Case for Externalism: Artifactual Essence
251We saw that whether or not artifactual kinds can be metaphysically sorted out in terms
252of their distinctive functions (in some sense of function), function doesn’t fit the use
253of artifactual words: we do not necessarily call by different names artifacts that have
254different functions (Aspirin before and after it started being produced as a blood
255diluter, Bell’s original telephone and the later communication device) nor do we call
256by the same name artifacts that have the same function (chaises and fauteuils, cups
257and mugs). This is why it has been proposed to identify an artifactual kind’s essence16
258with some combination of structural and functional features (Nelson 1982, 362), or
259with the conjunction of shape, proper function, and historically proper placement
260(Elder 2007). The latter suggestion is explicitly limited to “copied kinds” and said not
261to extend to “broad” kinds of artifacts such as chairs or tables; more precisely, “fairly
14 See the discussion of Putman below, 2.1.
15 Except on the Millikanian notion of function, on which the new reproduction-motivating function
generates a new artifactual kind. We saw, however, that on that notion metaphysically individuated
artifactual kinds do not coincide with extensions of artifactual words, hence the notion does not buttress
semantic externalism for such words.
16 More precisely, the set of features that determines an artifactual word’s extension.
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262specific familiar kinds of artifacts are all likely to [constitute copied kinds], and
263among these fairly specific kinds the more specific will in general be the more
264interesting copied kinds, the ones that display richer clusters of characteristic prop-
265erties” (Elder, 47). This appears to entail a semantic distinction, between artifactual
266words whose reference can be determined by essential properties (such as Eames
267chair) and other artifactual words whose reference is not so determined: so artifactual
268words in general do not have an externalist semantics, though some of them may
269come close.
270More radically, Nelson (1982) claimed that artifactual essence can be identified
271with “a certain combination of structural and functional features” (1982, 362). But it
272seems far from obvious that this can be done in every case. In many cases, even
273supposing the function to be easily singled out the disjunction of possible structures is
274very long indeed. There are, for example, all sorts of ovens: traditional ovens fed by
275wood or coal, electric ovens, gas ovens, microwave ovens, etc. Though they can all
276be ascribed the same function -cooking food- they have different structural features
277and different functioning mechanisms. Same with lamps, cars, books, etc.17
278This notwithstanding, suppose we can isolate a bundle of structural and functional
279features that are shared by all existing ovens. But then imagine that a new kind of
280cooking appliance is invented that lacks some of those features though it has others. It
281seems that whether or not it would be called ‘oven’ is up for grabs: it depends on
282many circumstances, commercial circumstances among others. Remember the differ-
283ent ways in which English and Italian handled the invention of hand processors:
284Italian called them blenders, English didn’t. Surely the extension of blender, or of
285oven, doesn’t seem to be governed by Nelson’s “essence” in the same way in which
286the extension of substance names is governed by molecular structure or atomic
287number.
288Similarly with possible worlds and the alleged necessity of structural and functional
289features. We can imagine a world where oven technology evolved differently and many
290cooking appliances were created sharing some features (but not others) with some of our
291ovens (though not with others): nuclear-powered ovens, motor ovens fed by gasoline,
292etc.. Whether they would be called oven is, again, up for grabs. So, even assuming that
293actual ovens share a well defined set of structural and functional features, it is doubtful
294that they would be necessary, contrary to Nelson’s thesis.
295In a short paper of 1982, Putman claimed that an alien anthropologist could do
296empirical research about our artifacts (e.g. about tools “endemic to our species”) and
297that his claims, if true, would be necessarily true, as they would describe features that
298are part of the objective pattern of our species. Terms for tools “could either be natural
299kind terms themselves or be essential properties of the natural kind Homo Sapiens”
300(1982, 419). If so, then extensions of artifactual terms would be determined by such
301objective features (“by a similarity relation pegged to a paradigm”, 418–9). Granted
302that empirical research on artifacts is indeed possible (as we just saw), the issue is
303whether the alien anthropologist could discover through such research what an
304artifact is, i.e. the essence of an artifactual kind. The issue is not whether the alien
305anthropologist could make discoveries about our tools: e.g. he could easily find out
17 This is the kind of difficulty that motivates Elder’s thesis that only for low-level kinds can essence be
identified with a certain combination of structural, functional and historical features.
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306that objects we call spoon are solid. Nor is the issue about whether artifacts have
307necessary features: I doubt one can imagine circumstances under which we might call
308anything liquid a spoon (though it may be just lack of imagination on my part).
309However, discovering that most, or even all actual As have F does not amount to
310discovering that F is part of the As’ essence: F might be a contingent property of the
311As. Even if every existing paint brush had synthetic bristles, brushes could have
312natural bristles as they once had. Nowadays, the insulator part of an electrical plug is
313made of a variety of plastic materials, none of which were used in early 20th century
314plugs. Clearly, not every universal feature of the As is a necessary feature.
315Could the alien anthropologist conclude that some universal feature of the As is a
316necessary feature (hence making steps towards discovering the essence of the As,
317what As are)? In the natural kind case, Kripke and Putnam conclude that “being
318H2O” and “having atomic number 79” are necessary features of water and gold
319respectively, on the basis of the intuition that physico-chemical constitution is
320essential to natural substances. Are there parallel intuitions in the artifactual case?
321The most promising candidate seems to be function: e.g., careful observation of our
322use of forks might convince the anthropologist that forks must be for picking food and
323bringing it to the mouth. But what if the anthropologist is so alien that, its biology
324being quite different, it doesn’t feed through the mouth at all? Couldn’t it take forks to
325be elements of some social ritual (occasionally performed in isolation, like prayer)?
326Similarly, it might take books to be essentially part of interior decoration, or photo-
327graphs (nowadays) to be a kind of videogame. In such cases, it would be missing the
328point of forks, books, and photographs: it wouldn’t really know what they are.
329Naturally, if the anthropologist came better to know and understand our culture he
330would learn about our alimentary habits; similarly if we were able to tell it what forks
331are. But this is reasoning in a circle: the anthropologist would be learning what forks
332are (to us) by learning about us, not by studying forks.
333Moreover, as we saw, few if any artifacts are individuated by function alone: there
334are cooking containers that are not called pots (e.g. pans), as there are oral commu-
335nication devices that are not called telephones (e.g. radio communication systems).
336So it seems that, contrary to Putman’s suggestion, artifactual essence -if there is one-
337cannot be discovered by empirical research.
3382.2 The Case for Externalism: Ignorance and Error Arguments
339Could we, as a linguistic community, be utterly ignorant or badly wrong about what
340one of our artifacts is? It may seem that we could, in two distinct ways. First of all, we
341might ignore that an artifact has an additional function beside the established one, e.g.
342that Aspirin is a powerful blood diluter in addition to being an antiinflammatory.
343Secondly, we might be mistakenly convinced that an artifact we have designed can do
344F, though it really cannot; instead, it can do G. The electricity wizard Nikola Tesla
345invented a receiver that he claimed could receive signals from extraterrestrial beings;
346it could not, though it was a perfectly sound wave receiver (it turned out to be
347receiving signals from Jupiter’s magnetosphere).18 However, neither case can really
348be described as a case in which we ignore, or are mistaken about what a certain
18 See Cheney 2001.
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349artifact is. In Tesla’s case, we (i.e. the scientific community) did not believe that his
350receiver could catch signals from outer space, though Tesla did. In the Aspirin case,
351though we were not aware of every causal effect of acetylsalicylic acid we were not
352entirely ignorant of “what Aspirin is”. Neither were we badly mistaken about it, as
353Aspirin was indeed, and still is, a pain reliever. If they are to buttress semantic
354externalism about artifactual kind words, ignorance and error arguments must be
355more radical than this. Such arguments were indeed proposed by Kornblith
356(ignorance) and Nelson (error).
357Against Schwartz, Kornblith (1980, 2007) argued that a speaker may use an
358artifactual word A to refer to members of an artifactual kind K even if she is unable
359to provide an adequate description of the Ks, indeed, even if she knows close to
360nothing about Ks. Hence, whether or not artifactual words have an externalist
361semantics they certainly do not have a descriptivist semantics, as Schwartz had
362claimed. To avoid an obvious objection (see above, fn.13), Kornblith imagines a
363speaker who is a complete stranger to the K-producing community: a Martian
364anthropologist that finds an Earthian object –a doorstop- and says: “Let’s call glug
365the kind this belongs to”. The Martian “has succeeded in using the word ‘glug’ to
366refer to doorstops” (1980, 114). Yet the Martian knows nothing about doorstops. This
367shows that in order to refer to doorstops it is not necessary to associate with a word
368(such as glug) a description that applies to all and only doorstops.
369Kornblith is obviously assuming that the Martian word glug refers to (our) kind
370“doorstop”, or to doorstops. But suppose the Martian finds another doorstop, of a
371different shape and material (let’s say the one he named was a block of iron whereas
372the new one is a wooden wedge). He would have no reason to call it glug, and he
373wouldn’t. Similarly for other kinds of doorstops. He might call glug other heavy
374blocks, some of them doorstops, some not. If a radical translator were to make a guess
375about his linguistic behaviour, Quine-wise, he would guess that in the Martian’s
376idiolect glug means “heavy block of a certain size and shape”, not “doorstop”. For his
377linguistic behaviour bears little connection with doorstops in particular. Moreover, as
378he knows nothing about doorstops we cannot attribute him the intention of naming
379doorstops rather than heavy blocks of a certain size and shape, or primitive weapons,
380or weights. In what sense, then, did he “succeed in using the word ‘glug’ to refer to
381doorstops”, as it may well be that most objects he calls glug are not doostops while
382many he does not call thus are, indeed, doorstops?
383It could be objected that the Martian intended to baptize the kind that object
384belongs to, and as a matter of fact that kind is the kind of doorstops. Hence, the kind
385he intended to name, and succeeded in naming, is the kind of doorstops. As naming is
386a form of referential use of a word, he succeeded in using glug to refer to doorstops.
387His linguistic behaviour only shows him to be frequently in error with respect to his
388own linguistic stipulation: the Martian is in no worse shape than a Twin Earthian who,
389visiting the Earth before 1750, believes to have found vast amounts of waterTE right
390on its surface. However, as I just pointed out, the object the Martian found and
391baptized belongs to several kinds: primitive weapons, heavy objects of a certain
392shape and size, objects made of iron, weights, and doorstops. Nothing in the
393Martian’s baptismal act, or in the intentions that can be attributed to him, or in his
394subsequent use of the word provides any ground for conjecturing that he was
395selecting doorstops among the many kinds the object belongs to (we are assuming
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396with Kornblith that the Martian is totally ignorant of our culture, including our need
397for and use of doorstops: he doesn’t know about the object’s point). If doorstops were
398the only kind of which the object could reasonably be regarded as a member, one
399might say he has named doorstops whether or not he knows. But this is not the
400case—indeed, it is probably never the case with medium-sized physical objects. So,
401again, the claim that the Martian named doorstops and is using glug to refer to
402doorstops seems unwarranted.
403Kornblith could, however, insist that the Martian intended to name the kind that
404the object was originally intended to belong to. He is like an Earthian archeologist
405who finds (what she believes to be) an artifact from some remote civilization and
406conventionally calls it flust, to refer to whatever artifact that object was intended to be
407by the ancient people that produced it. Flust is meant to refer to whatever artifactual
408kind this object belongs to (if it is, indeed, an artifact), as individuated within the
409remote civilization that produced it (and, perhaps, its likes). But then, isn’t this a
410description by deference? The archeologist is not introducing flust to name whatever
411has the same shape as this object (for all she knows, shape may be irrelevant), nor
412whatever has the same function as this object (it may have many): she is introducing
413flust for whatever the ancient people would consider to be in the same category as
414this. In other words, she is deferring to their conception of the relevant artifactual kind
415(if such a kind exists).19 The reference of flust is not governed by objective features
416the object shares with other members of the same kind, but by some communal
417criterion that is assumed to exist even though it cannot be specified. The
418archeologist’s use of flust can be called “non-descriptive” only in the sense that it
419is governed by a description that the archeologist herself is (perhaps temporarily)20
420not in the position to specify: this is why it is so utterly ineffective on her linguistic
421behaviour.
422By the way, it is not by chance that in real life, as distinct from thought experi-
423ments, mysterious (presumptive) artifacts from remote civilizations are referred to by
424general expressions such as ware or tool, often accompanied by information about
425place of finding (Ica stones, Costa Rica stone spheres). Such denominations are
426clearly meant to name a set rather than a kind. They may of course be turned into
427names of kinds once information becomes available as to their point in the remote
428civilization itself.
429Nelson (1982), as we saw, claimed that artifactual kinds have essences consisting
430of features that are both metaphysically necessary and epistemically contingent. To
431show that they are epistemically contingent, he produced a modified version of
432Putnam’s thought experiment: he imagined that pencils might turn out to be alien
433devices planted on Earth to manipulate us humans. They are not, and never were used
434for writing (the belief that they are and always were is the effect of a collective
435illusion). Thus, in the situation of the thought experiment we are badly in error about
436what pencils are, but, nevertheless, our word pencil refers to those objects -the alien
437devices- and keeps referring to them after the discovery that they were never used for
438writing.
19 Obviously not to their use of the word flust, for they did not use that word.
20 I am hinting at the possibility that the archeologist may later find written documents or other testimony of
the role the object he found may have played in the life of the ancient community that produced it.
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439Putnam had introduced the pencil-organisms thought experiment to show that it is
440not epistemically necessary that pencils are artifacts: hence, even “Pencils are
441artifacts” is not analytic and cannot be regarded as part of the meaning of pencil. It
442could then be replied (as Schwartz did, 1978, 568–9) that there was no particular
443reason to assume that “being an artifact” was part of the description originally
444associated with pencil: consequently, there was no reason to conclude that the original
445description would not apply to pencil-organisms. All the counterfactual example
446showed was that “either pencil is indexical or … if it is not indexical “being an
447artifact” is not part of its meaning”. By modifying the example, Nelson makes this
448reply implausible: if there is a definition of pencil, then surely “used for writing”must
449be part of it. However, though stronger in this respect Nelson’s thought experiment is
450even less plausible than Putnam’s. If pencils were never used for writing, so that they
451never left traces on paper, lots of human events become very hard to account for:
452certain notes were never taken, certain documents were never signed, etc. Or perhaps
453those notes were taken and those documents signed, though not by means of pencils:
454it was part of the alien-originated illusion that traces appeared on paper corresponding
455to our writing intentions. And so forth. So, it is not clear that Nelson’s pencil-illusion
456can be the subject of a coherent and not globally sceptical story. But Nelson’s thought
457experiment is less convincing than Putnam’s in another respect as well: it is more
458clearly liable to the “persistence of descriptions” objection. If pencils turned out not to
459be writing instruments we would probably feel the need for such things; we would
460then make them and -plausibly- call them pencils, or possibly genuine pencils. The
461old description associated with the word pencil prevails: it has simply turned out not
462to apply to the alien devices, the pseudo-pencils.
463It could be objected that, still, as long as the alien-induced delusion lasted the word
464pencil did refer to the spying devices, in spite of the linguistic community’s deep error
465concerning their nature and function. Indeed, there is no doubt that the spying devices
466were part of the community’s life, including its use of pencil (though they were
467neither produced nor used the way people believed they were). Nevertheless, we can
468well imagine that once the illusion has faded, people would say “We used to call
469pencils those objects, but they are not, and never were pencils: these we are now
470making are the genuine pencils!”. They would thereby be stating that pencil never
471referred to the alien devices (see Schwartz 1983): their belief that it did was just part
472of their overall delusion about them, on a par with the belief that they were made in
473certain factories, used for writing, etc. Notice the difference with respect to Putnam’s
474robocats example: though cats have turned out to be robots, their cat-like behaviour
475and their interaction with humans was no illusion. Most of our beliefs about cats have
476turned out to be true, including beliefs about their role in our life. Not so with
477Nelson’s pencils: this is why the persistence of description tends to disqualify even
478our previous use of pencil.
4793 Thomasson’s Communitarian Internalism
480Let us take stock. Externalism about artifactual words requires that (a) members of an
481artifactual word’s extension share a common nature, i.e. a set of necessary features,
482and (b) that possession of such features determines the word’s extension
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483independently of whether the linguistic community is aware of them (ignorance) or
484can accurately describe them (error). However, (a) many common artifactual words
485appear to be so used that few features are universally shared among members of their
486extensions, and even fewer can be plausibly regarded as necessary (i.e., even assum-
487ing that all existing things that are called A have feature F, many possible things
488lacking F might or might not be called A); morevoer, (b) it is highly doubtful that a
489speaker could manage to refer to kind Awhile being utterly ignorant of the role the As
490play in the A-producing community, as in Kornblith’s thought experiment, and it is
491no less doubtful that an artifactual word A that was used to refer to certain things
492would keep referring to them (and being regarded as having referred to them) once it
493has been shown that the associated description is utterly false of such things; the
494reason being that we could easily make things that do fit the associated description.
495As an alternative to externalism, Amie Thomasson proposed a form of communi-
496tarian internalism: artifactual terms do not refer to artifactual kinds “independently of
497all human beliefs and concepts about the nature of the kind” (2007, 65). The concept
498of the kind’s creator(s) are constitutive of the nature of the kind “available for
499reference”. Thomasson insists that hers is not a descriptivist view, meaning that on
500her view the reference of an artifactual word is not determined by the sense of some
501description every competent speaker associates with the word. However, if the
502“makers and sustainers” of the kind are in possession of a concept that fixes the
503kind’s nature -hence the reference of the relevant artifactual word- the difference
504between communitarian internalism and Thomasson’s view appears to be very thin
505indeed. It seems that if the Makers know what it is to be an A, they also know what A
506refers to at least in the sense that in most cases they are not going to be grossly
507mistaken, or utterly puzzled about whether something ought to be called an A.
508Moreover, such knowledge is usually no secret: it is not confined to private docu-
509ments or to the Maker’s mind but deposited in patents, illustrated in textbooks and
510technical documents, taught and learned in schools and universities. It is a paradigm
511of communitarian, public knowledge.
512Nothing wrong with this as far as I am concerned. However, it is not so
513clear that it is really the Makers’, rather than the users’ concept that matters.
514Take Nelson’s example of the spying pencils. On Thomasson’s view, the
515example shows that we may be wrong about who the makers of an artifact
516are (2007, 68): in this case the evil aliens are the makers, hence their concept
517determines what it is to be a pencil, and the reference of pencil. Consequently,
518pencil could never refer to the notionally familiar writing instruments we would
519start producing after debunking the aliens’ devices: we could not call them
520pencil, for pencils are what conforms to the aliens’ concept of pencil. But we
521saw that, plausibly, we would indeed call the newly produced artifacts pencils,
522as they conform to our (the users’) concept of what it is to be a pencil.
5234 A Pluralistic Semantics for Artifactual Terms
524Like artifacts, artifactual names are a mixed bunch. There are, I believe, no semantic
525generalizations that extend to every word that could be called an artifactual name as it is
526used for material entities that would not exist without the active, conscious and
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527deliberate operation of human beings.21 I will mention three categories of artifactual
528words with different semantic properties, but I am not ruling out that there may be more
529categories, or semantically significant subcategories of these three.
530(1) Names of quasi-natural artifactual kinds. There are artifactual kinds, such as
531artificial substances like Aspirin and partly artificial organisms like anthropo-
532genic hybrids and GMOs, that may be called quasi-natural because they share
533many properties of natural kinds: first and foremost, their members share a
534nature in the plain sense in which gold and cats can be said to have a nature (not
535in the gerrymandered sense in which sloops and pencils have been taken by
536some to have a nature).22 Correspondingly, the reference of names for such
537kinds, like Aspirin or GMO#3266, is determined by possession of certain natural
538properties: any substance that is acetylsalicylic acid can be called Aspirin, even
539though it may not be legal to commercialize it under that name (as Aspirin is a
540trademark owned by Bayer). If we discovered, in some faraway planet, an
541organism that has the same DNA as GMO#3266 we would be right in saying
542that on that planet GMO#3266 was made by nature, not by man: on that planet
543GMO#3266 is not a genetically modified organism.
544Prima facie, it may seem there is a difference between artificial substances and
545artificial organisms (and their names) concerning possible communitarian ignorance
546and error. Particularly in the case of anthropogenic hybrids, it may well be that their
547nature is unknown not just to users of their names but to their creators; this was
548certainly the case -at least in the present understanding of knowing the nature of an
549organism- with hybrids that were created before modern biology came into existence.
550By contrast, the nature of manufactured substances (one feels) must be known to their
551producers since the beginning: could we make Aspirin if we didn’t know what kind of
552substance it is? But in fact, there is no such difference. Alloys such as bronze and
553substances such as gunpowder were created at a time when people had no idea of
554chemistry. To be sure, the creators had some idea of what they were doing: indeed,
555they had relatively well defined procedures to go by in producing bronze or gun-
556powder. But so had many creators of (anthropogenic) hybrid plants. So it appears that
557with quasi-natural kinds, both ignorance and error are possible. Names of quasi-
558natural artifactual kinds have an externalist semantics.
559(2) Family names of artifacts. At the opposite extreme, the reference of many
560common artifactual words such as chair, boat, car, desk, oven does not appear
561to be determined on the basis of possession of essential properties, be they
562structural or functional (or both). Take the words chair and armchair. A
21 L. R. Baker claimed that the traditional distinction between “mind-dependent” and “mind-independent”
entities is misguided: it doesn’t draw the ontological line in an interesting place and it is rapidly being made
obsolete by technology. But even if “the distinction between artifacts and natural objects will become
increasingly fuzzy” (2004, 107), there will still be unproblematic artifacts, and their names. It seems to me
that the semantic variety I am pointing out does concern such unproblematic cases.
22 Grandy (2007, 28) suggested that for “artifact substances” physical and chemical constitution should be
the essence, as for natural substances. Obviously this does not generalize to all artifactual words; it is rather
a way of taking names of artificial substances apart from other artifactual words.
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563dictionary of English defines armchair as “a chair with armrests”.23 Hence,
564armchairs are chairs; so if chairs have an essence, it is shared by armchairs.
565However, chairs are called chaises in French and sedie in Italian, while arm-
566chairs are called fauteuils and poltrone respectively. No French speaker would
567call chaise an armchair, nor would an Italian speaker call it a sedia.24 So, on the
568essentialist view of the reference of artifactual words, we ought to conclude that,
569all these centuries, speakers of French and Italian have missed the common
570nature of chaises and fauteuils, sedie and poltrone, whereas speakers of English
571got it right at least since the XVII century; or alternatively, that English speakers
572misguidedly believe that chairs and armchairs share some deep nature whereas
573they don’t, as French and Italian speakers have been pointing out. Clearly, it is
574more plausible to conclude that English, French, and Italian all regarded certain
575characteristic differences between otherwise pretty similar objects as interesting
576enough to deserve distinct lexical items (names), but, contrary to English,
577French and Italian took such differences to originate disjoint extensions. In
578other words, one may or may not decide to regard armchairs as chairs,
579depending on whether one wants to stress similarities or differences. French
580and Italian made one decision, English made the opposite decision.
581Now, this physiognomy is characteristic of words that are used for objects or
582phenomena that are “related to one another in many different ways” though they
583“have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all”, as
584Wittgenstein said (Philosophical Investigations, §65), i.e. of so called “family
585names”.25 Family names have neither an externalist nor an internalist semantics: lack
586of a common nature defeats externalism, while lack of a specifiable criterion of
587application (whether individual or communitarian, linguistic or non-linguistic) de-
588feats internalism.26 As Wittgenstein pointed out, it is indeed possible to fix such a
589criterion for a variety of practical purposes; in such a case one would be “drawing a
590boundary where no one has so far been drawn” (§68). For example, the European
591Union has been busy drawing such boundaries for a variety of kinds, both natural and
592artificial. However, the influence of such circumscribing decisions on the actual use
593of language appears to be small: semantic efficacy is limited to commercial and legal
594procedures.
595(3) Criterial names of artifacts. Finally, some artifactual words have an internalist
596semantics. There are (at least) two kinds of examples. First of all, there are
23 Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed., 1997.
24 French dictionaries typically define fauteuil as “siège [not “chaise”] à bras”, i.e. “a seat with armrests”
(e.g. “grand siège à dossier et à bras”, Nouveau Larousse Illustré); Italian dictionaries define poltrona as
“sedile [not “sedia”]… fornito di imbottitura”, i.e. “a padded seat” (Nuovissimo Dardano, Dizionario della
lingua italiana, Curcio, Roma).
25 On this kind of semantic account for artifactual words see Lawler and Vega (2010) and (2011).
Unfortunately, I only became aware of their papers when this had already been completed.
26 Hence I am not taking the externalism/internalism distinction to be dichotomic, and I see no reason why
it ought to be. There may be (and, in my opinion, there are) words whose use is governed neither by a well
defined set of criteria (internalism, whether individualistic or communitarian) nor by identity of nature with
paradigmatic examples (externalism) but by loosely defined, negotiable criteria of application. If one
wishes to describe such a semantic pattern as “vague internalism”, or “internalism without fixed criteria”,
so be it.
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597artifactual words that are legally tied to technical descriptions by patents or other
598public documents. A Pearsall mousetrap, for example, is precisely described by a
5991968 patent: nothing counts as a Pearsall mousetrap unless it fits the description. If
600someone produced an object fitting the description it would have to pay rights to
601the heirs of Ralph E. Pearsall even if he intended to use it to catch beetles or sell it
602as a souvenir of the Great Plague (so the Maker’s intention doesn’t count). The
603description cannot be unknown to the linguistic community, nor could the com-
604munity be in error about it (though of course individual speakers might). If the
605description were unknown, there would be no such thing as a Pearsall mousetrap
606and the name would have no use. Morevoer, the community could only be in error
607about what such mousetraps are in either of two cases: if the patent were generally
608misunderstood, or if it were utterly disregarded in common usage of the name. In
609the former case, they would not be referring to genuine Pearsall mousetraps (with
610possibile legal implications); in the latter, it would be appropriate to say that a new
611meaning has been introduced for Pearsall mousetrap, perhaps related to the old
612meaning, perhaps not.
613Another kind of examples is represented by words such as screwdriver. Screw-
614drivers are of different materials, though variation is limited; shape varies, but within
615limits; proper function is stable, as screwdrivers are constantly produced to operate on
616screws in a characteristic way. Doubts about whether a newly produced object would
617count as a screwdriver would be rare (dispositional function would probably resolve
618them). So, screwdrivers are respectable candidates to sharing an essence in Nelson’s
619or in Elder’s sense, though perhaps a pretty intricate, disjunctive essence. Is screw-
620driver’s semantics externalist, then, contrary to what I just claimed? No, because we
621could not refer to screwdrivers (using screwdriver) while ignoring their (putative)
622essence. If we found objects from a long lost civilization looking like screwdrivers we
623could not determine that they are screwdrivers—only that they can operate as such.
624To determine that they are screwdrivers we would have to know the reasons they
625were produced for, the needs they served, the use they were put to: in a word, their
626point. But in the absence of information about the producers‘ and users’ aims and
627intentions, an artifact’s point cannot be derived from the analysis of material, mech-
628anism, or even function(s) in the dispositional sense.
629Here we may see a difference between screwdriver and Pearsall mousetrap.
630Suppose Pearsall mousetraps are individuated only by description of material,
631shape and mechanism: the patent makes no mention of the contraption’s
632purpose. If so, then if we found an alien object fitting the patent specifications
633we would have to say -I take it- that the Martians invented the Pearsall
634mousetrap centuries before Pearsall. However, it looks more plausible to as-
635sume that the patent specifications do include function; if so, we could only
636conclude that the Martians invented something that could work just as a
637Pearsall mousetrap.
638So, both Pearsall mousetrap and screwdriver turn out to have an internalist
639semantics. The semantics of Pearsall mousetrap is community-internalist, as the
640individuating description is available to the linguistic community rather than, or more
641often than to individual speakers; by contrast, the description associated with screw-
642driver -including the screwdrivers’ proper function- comes very close to being the
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643possession of individual competent speakers. If a speaker knew that a certain object is
644called screwdriver but didn’t know what screwdrivers are for, we wouldn’t count her
645as competent on screwdriver; we would not appeal to deference, like we would with,
646say, with speaker that knew that a certain animal is called a dolphin but believed it to
647be a kind of fish.
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